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HISTORY AS PAST SOCIOLOGY: A REVIEW ESSAY 
(Samuel P. Hays, American Political History as Social Analysis.)* 
This tastefully produced collection of sixteen essays, nearly 
all published previously, but in widely disparate journals, plus a 
long autobiographical introduction and a brief epilogue, affords an 
opportunity for evaluating the first two decades of Samuel P. Hays's 
contributions to American political and social history. Historians 
excel in different genres. Some are most proficient in the research 
monograph, some in the popular book or article, some on the editorial 
chair, some on the lecture platform, some, whose talents remain 
largely hidden from the professional community, in the small class or 
tutorial. Hays's metier is the provocative, speculative essay. And 
while it might be feared that this form of scholarly communication 
would date more quickly than others, in Hays's case at least, the 
essays remain fresh. Indeed, their grouping here encourages the 
reader to make connections between arguments and to realize the larger 
significance of points he may have missed or bypassed when he first 
perused the papers under separate covers. It is a book to muse over, 
scribble on, steal ideas from, rave at -- in short, a book designed to 
stimulate thought. 
* Knoxville, Tennessee: The University of Tennessee 
Press, 1980. 
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Every historian's vision -- the problems he concentrates on 
and the facets of those situations he notices, if not so directly and 
inevitably the solutions he propounds -- is blindered by his personal 
experience. Born into a family which had moved to extreme southern 
Indiana early and largely stayed put for six generations, Sam Hays 
went off to Swarthmore and Harvard, and spent his teaching career in 
the midwest, but not in the Hoosier State. To someone with such a 
background and life course, a fascination with genealogy came as 
naturally as the realization that citified "progressivism" and drives 
for "modernization" represented not just objective responses to 
changed conditions, but value judgments no more deserving of 
unthinking acceptance than their opponents' resistance to reform was. 
Robert Merton's contrast between parochials and cosmopolitans was, for 
Hays, lived experience. A World War II conscientious objector, Hays 
was no reactionary adopting and adapting Lee Benson's ethnocultural 
thesis in an attempt to put down economic determinism. But neither 
was he born to urban liberalism, as Richard Hofstadter and Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., Hays's intellectual nemises were, and their main 
project -- describing and criticizing modern liberalism from the 
inside, with sympathy -- differed profoundly from Hays's no less 
grandiose task -- understanding the conflicts between those who sought 
to impose what the reformers claimed were universalistic values and 
methods of organization on others who clung to their own very 
different beliefs and styles of life. 
Hays's method of attack, his informal philosophy of history, 
was shaped importantly, he remarks (p. 5), by his in~ersion in the 
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gestalt approach as a Swarthmore undergraduate psychology major. Much 
more inductive and non-mathematical than other schools of social 
science, but much less wedded to impressionistic methods and to an 
emphasis on "irrational" explanations for behavior than psychoanalysis 
is, gestalt psychology's most familiar work has explored shifts and 
differences in perception -- pervasive themes in Hays's work. As a 
historian, he has, in accordance with, if not on account of his 
adherence to his early training, emphasized "concepts," simple figures 
emerging from a ground, rather than more fully articulated, 
aprioristic "theories," and distrusted enthusiasm for complex 
statistical techniques as much as he has been chary of non-rational 
approaches to studying human actions. 
Hays absorbed the middle-level sociology and political science 
of group behavior, but not social psychology, nor the grand theories 
of Talcott Parsons or Karl Marx, nor the mathematical sociology of 
Otis Dudley Duncan or Leo Goodman, nor the economics-oriented 
literature of "positive" political theory, through individual reading. 
How different social history might have been if Hays had majored in 
math, economics, or literature, or supped at some other sociological 
or political scientific tables! Thus, although his intellectual 
experience is more eclectic than that of conventional historians, 
Hays's condemnation of "narrow technical training and work" in 
graduate school, which he thinks may cause historians' minds to become 
"confined and rigid much too early" (p. 44) is unreflective. Both 
breadth and narrowness are inevitable; the questions are always which 
of the many possible subjects to study and how deep to go into anyone 
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of them, and in these matters, many will reasonably disagree with 
Hays's example and prescriptions. 
The substantive essays contain hardly a sniff of the 
monograph. Traditional empirical historians, to exaggerate a bit, 
proceed by picking a topic, immersing themselves in the relevant 
collections of manuscripts, official documents, and newspapers, and 
then and only then consciously putting what they've found into 
patterns; most "new" empirical historians' procedures are much the 
same, except that quantifiable data supplements conventional sources. 
Hays's habit, at least in the production of these papers, is quite 
different. He reads some secondary works, thinks out their 
implications, applies the resulting ideas to small case studies 
himself or assigns the projects to students, and then generalizes the 
findings rather broadly, if usually tentatively. Thus, having noted 
that municipal reformers often took the business corporation as a 
model and boasted of the support of chambers of commerce, and that 
James Weinstein had shown that businessmen were behind many of the 
moves to adopt commission and city manager government, Hays looked at 
the struggles over the adoption of the city commission in three Iowa 
cities and suggested that similar clashes between upper-class, often 
prohibitionist centralizers and lower class, often "wet" and and 
immigrant sub-communities probably lay behind conflicts over municipal 
reform throughout the country (pp. 61-62, 205-32). The empiricists' 
procedure is to research first, ask questions later; its virtue is 
solidity, and its fault, lack of clear direction. Hays's technique is 
to contemplate first, throw out suggestions, and hope that the 
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research gets done sometime by somebody; its strength is stimulation 
and its shortcoming, which he recognizes (p. 50), is incompleteness. 
In a particularly provactive passage, for instance, Hays asserts that 
"Too complete immersion in evidence may well dull the historical 
imagination so as to obscure other possible ways of looking at the 
past, and may require a complete shift from evidence into more 
abstract concepts in order to free one's imagination for a fresh set 
of observations."(p. 110) 
If free, Hays's imagination is certainly not undisciplined. 
Somewhat surprisingly, this book reveals that his point of view bears 
a striking resemblance to that of the older Annales school -- the 
sociological, or perhaps geographical approach of Braudel rather than 
the currently trendy "anthropological" bent of Le Roi Ladurie. 
Without citing any of their works, even in his discussions of family 
reconstitution, presumably because he came to his conclusions 
independently, Hays shares their distaste for what both he and Braudel 
call "event history" (p. 116), static social science, and complex 
quantification (pp. 128-29). Although somewhat more concerned with 
explanation than the French are, Hays is equally skeptical of large or 
highly abstract theories. "Concepts without reference to concrete 
cases lead to irrelevant abstractions; data development without 
conceptual guides produces a melange of unrelated and insignificant 
facts." (p. 180) Analytical history, not economics, is for Hays, as 
for the Sixieme Section, the preeminent discipline in the study of 
society. 
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Like the Annalistes, Hays sees history as an "attempt to 
reconstruct the process by which societies change over time. The 
emphasis is on society as a whole, not isolated segments of it, and 
broad changes over time, not episodes." (p. 129, my italics) Despite 
the fact that his own major published monographic research treats only 
the period from 1880 to 1920, Hays seems to aspire to uncover the 
longue duree: "The historian is uniquely concerned with long-run 
social change, change over not just two or three years but over 
decades and centuries." (pp. 145-46, his italics) If he implicitly 
rejects the French dogma that politics is too transitory and 
superficial to be worth attention, Hays considers political history 
interesting and useful chiefly for the light it throws on social 
values, structure, and processes. 
It is from this nearly Annaliste platform that Hays launches 
his telling critique of the old political and social history. 
Ironically like Charles A. Beard debunking the Founding Fathers, Hays 
castigates what he terms the "liberal" or "reform" view of American 
politics, in which "the people" confront "the interests," as 
normative, rather than objective, and as misleading, because it fails 
to cut through rhetoric to expose the clashing social values of 
competing groups (pp. 68-70). Conservation and municipal reform, for 
example, were not struggles between good guys and bad guys, but 
between sets of people with markedly different mentalites (pp. 215-
16). This failure of "liberal history" to identify the opposing 
groups' outlooks correctly, Hays contends, paradoxically makes the 
chief scholarly proponents of a "conflict" view of American history 
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into "consensus" historians, since they assume that all "the people" 
shared an ideology, which "the interests" opposed not because of 
disagreements over ultimate goals, but on account of immediate, naked 
self-interest (pp. 68,148). 
Adopting Thomas Cochran's influential censure of the 
"presidential synthesis," Hays also finds fault with previous 
historians for ignoring politics at the "grass roots" (pp. 53, 66-67). 
Concentrating only on who won each election, rather than what the 
votes reveal about the distribution of popular attitudes, overly 
concerned with single events, rather than with larger structures and 
processes, basing their analyses too much on words and therefore 
putting too much stress on such national issues as trusts and tariffs, 
rather than founding their conclusions on analyses of voting behavior, 
which, Hays believes, show that voters were much more worried about 
such long-term local conflicts as those over prohibition, the "reform" 
historians have, according to HaYf' fundamentally distorted what 
actually happened (pp. 54-56,63,78,88-92, 115-16, 137, 149,365). 
Had they looked more closely at local scenes, he contends, historians 
would have put much greater emphasis on continual ethnocultural 
conflicts and less on changes in control at the national level, which 
he thinks were less important to the electorate (p. 85). Furthermore, 
the "reformers" (as well as some of Hays's students -- a fact that he 
fails to point out) have erred in treating the extension or decrease 
of governmental activity as a single phenomenon, instead of realizing 
that a particular group may want state control expanded in some areas 
at the same time as it desires government to leave other behavior 
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alone (pp. 56-59). 
Hays also indicts political historians on three counts of 
formalism. Mesmerized by government, they have neglected to extend 
the study of power relationships to non-official activities, as, for 
instance, those in educational, social, and economic groups and 
institutions (pp. 67, 88-91, 98). Transfixed by laws, they have 
failed to step back and consider the larger trends which complexes of 
laws represented -- for example, in twentieth century America, 
tendencies toward centralization, systematization, the imposition of 
cosmpolitan values, and the use of scientific or technical criteria in 
management and problem-solving (pp. 76, 81, 85). Wont to speak of 
such "broad forces" as "progressivism," they have played down "the 
peculiarities of the human situation," therefore depersonalizing and 
distorting their histories and giving them the character of teleology, 
rather than of group struggle (pp. 51, 110-11). 
Yet when they have looked at groups or individuals, Hays 
faults them for other errors. Recognizing that the study of politics 
may properly involve treatment of elites, he takes to task some 
previous historians who have carried out collective biographies, such 
as Alfred Chandler, Richard Hofstadter, and George Mowry, for 
generalizing on the basis of flawed research designs (pp. 71-73, 206-
08). Moreover, he charges that biographies of single figures, which 
at least used to be the prime genre in political history, almost 
inevitably beg the question of their subjects' importance and of the 
relationship between the life and the times (pp. 92-93). About the 
only hope for political history, as Hays sees it, is to die and be 
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born again as social history. 
Not that he is uncritical of social history, either. An 
"amorphous" bundle of topics which did not fit under the traditional 
political, economic, or diplomatic rubrics, social history has lacked 
"conceptual framework[s]." "While giving rise to new content, social 
history has failed to develop its promise of bringing order into the 
subject matter of history as a whole" (p. 133). Shackled to a 
"progressive" point of view dating from its beginnings in the 1920s 
and 30s, social history has habsorbed the 'problem-policy' perspective 
of social reform," treating members of disadvantaged groups as 
"problems," but rarely analyzing the problem-solvers themselves, 
taking the explanations of reformers, which are actually quite 
colored, at face value (pp. 138-41, 205-06). The same ideological 
bent has led social historians to misclassify the forces of change and 
those of resistance. For, Hays asserts, while the upper class, often 
through the private business corporation, has taken the lead in 
"sweeping away old institutions and creating new," and the lower 
strata have been more conservative, more resistant to change, social 
historians have usually seen things the other way around (p. 159). 
Partaking of some of the "formalist" traits of political historians, 
moreover, social historians have devoted too much attention to 
organized groups (for instance, labor unions), and too little to less 
structured ones which left poor records. 
Nor does even the "new social history" escape criticism. 
Studies of geographical mobility have overstated the flux and chaos of 
American society because they have given too little weight to the fact 
10 
that movement took place within a set of relatively fixed social 
structures and according to a patterned life cycle process (p. 192). 
Young men moved, but settled down by middle age, and even when they 
traveled, the social structures in the cities, towns, and rural areas 
in which they relocated closely res sembled these from which they had 
come. 
But Hays is not merely a critic. Implicit in his critiques 
and explicit in other essays is a sketch of a general "conceptual 
framework," modernization, which he has developed to take the place of 
the "reform" orientation's description of American life over the last 
century (p. 431). Conservation and municipal reform are Hays's chief 
examples of the process by which America has become more organized and 
integrated, and more subject to the control of a scientific and 
professional elite, an elite which composes a new upper class and is 
allied with people whose privileged positions derive from wealth. 
Functional organizations of kindred workers and professionals, 
planners and economic interest groups have replaced geographically-
based political parties and local business concerns as the prime 
movers in the public and private policy arenas. The greater 
complexity of the economy and the society and the increased 
geographical scope of decision-making units have heightened the 
importance of control over the means of communication; conversely, 
those with expertise in or access to wide-scale communications have 
sought to extend their influence by transferring authoritative power 
from lower to higher levels of government. Thus, organizations have a 
built-in drive both to expand and to centralize, and their dynamics 
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give rise to a series of continual conflicts between cosmopolitan 
experts and those parochial forces who can exert their maximum 
influence only if decision-making authority remains at lower, more 
geographically restricted levels of government (pp. 247-61). By 
attending to and largely accepting the rhetoric of the intelligencia, 
historians have both distorted the nature of the conflicts and 
overlooked these broader and more important trends. 
Hays asserts that the control of municipal governments in the 
United States, for example, has gone through three stages over the 
last century and a half. In the pedestrian city, local notables 
easily dominated ward and town meetings. The initial stages of 
suburbanization, which encouraged middle-class flight from the urban 
core, increased the city's class and ethnic homogeneity and left many 
city wards in the hands of small businessmen and "machine" 
politicians. But continued population growth put a premium on 
influence over the technology of mass communications, and this 
development, coupled with the widespread switch from ward to at-large 
electoral systems, restored the privileged to urban dominance -- a 
process which did not go unnoticed or unchallenged by those whom the 
new system displaced (p. 345). 
While his criticisms have alerted historians to unexamined 
assumptions, illogical arguments, and counterproductive limitations on 
data sources which have flawed previous work, and while his often 
fresh and cogent suggestions have helped to shape both the new 
political and the new social history, Hays's program for historical 
studies seems to me to contain fundamental deficiencies, many of them 
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similar to those which he has pointed out in the work of other 
historians. "Concept" is one of Hays's favorite words. It or its 
variants occur, for instance, six times on page 433, and probably 
several hundred times in the book as a whole. Unlike "theories" or 
"hypotheses," which invite tests, suggest falsifiability, are 
inherently explanatory statements, "concepts" or "conceptual 
frameworks" are purely descriptive, are mere rubrics, organizing 
devices, interpretive stances. Calling Gifford Pinchot a 
cosmopolitan, or a branch of evangelical religion "modern" or another 
"fundamentalist" merely affixes labels to them. To name is not to 
explain. Hays's preferred type of history leaves the causes out, and 
that is, to me at least, unacceptable. 
Several of the specific concepts which Hays employs, moreover, 
seem teleological, even Hegelian. Hays does not use "modernization" 
normatively, as others have, but he does see it as linear, unitary, 
and probably irreversible, and he reifies it. On page 286, for 
instance, we read that "The educational system, therefore, provided an 
instrument for modernizing forces to work their way out •• • " On 
pages 246-47, we learn that "In the modern technical system, however, 
there is a dynamic, self-generating and self-sustaining, which 
embodies the spirit of science, empirical inquiry, and planned 
environmental manipulation," and on page 249 that" ••• the long-run 
tendencies in system organization did not lean naturally toward 
decentralization and smaller units of organization, but, on the 
contrary, toward larger and larger units of control. " (my italics) 
But systems don't act; only people do. To attribute will or 
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tendencies or spirits to disembodied notions is simply nonsensical. 
Sometimes like Hegel, Hays at other times resembles Marx 
upending Hegel. If he does not reduce ideology to the status of a 
mere superstructure, Hays does believe that a political movement's 
stated intellectual positions reveal little about the nature of that 
movement. "The peculiarities of a political movement are rarely 
observable from the political ideology •••• They can be determined, 
however, from the way in which the people involved in that movement 
differ from others in the political structure." (p. 100) 
Prohibitionism and temperance, for instance, which he believes were 
strongest in the upper class during the l840s and 50s, the middle 
class from 1865 to 1890, and rural dwellers afterwards, were merely 
"instruments of social control," attempts to impose one group's 
general cultural predispositions on another set of people (p. 90). 
Dry rhetoric about alcohol abuse offers no more of a key to the cold-
water movement than progressive pronouncements do to that crusade. 
Similarly, in designing undergraduate history curricula, Hays opposes 
organizing courses around ideas and would delete "art, literature, and 
philosophy" from history courses because students tend to divorce them 
from life and to consider them as "artifacts to be studied for their 
own sake" (p. 404). 
Yet to subtract the study of culture from the study of 
cultures is surely to render each less interesting, and, more 
important, incomplete. That history students often believe ideas have 
lives of their own or at least that thoughts have consequences 
suggests that people in the past may have felt so, too, and that they 
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may have acted, at times, in response to ideas. Furthermore, Hays's 
crude sociology of knowledge approach mistakes ideologies for mantras. 
He apparently believes that if ideas mean anything, they don't mean at 
all what they say. He rejects, for instance, the conservationists' 
self-conception that they were interested in controlling development 
in order to preserve forests, wilderness, and other non-replenishable 
resources in favor of the view that the movement was "a phase of the 
impulse in modern science for precision, efficiency, order, and 
system." (p. 235) Yet even if he were right, his analysis wouldn't 
answer the question of why systematic thought bubbled up when and 
where it did and why it took the form of the conservation movement. 
Further, if there were any way to decide that his position was more 
correct -- and he presents none -- it would not follow that the 
leaders' expressed ideas were irrelevant to understanding the 
movement, for their followers may have been attracted by the overt, 
not the allegedly latent ideology. Likewise, white ribboners may have 
just wanted to save themselves and others from the horrors and 
consequences of drunkenness. Conclusions on such matters require a 
more sophisticated research design than Hays offers. The place of 
ideas in politics is too complex a question to be settled merely by 
assertion or assumption. 
Politics for Hays is merely a corollary to society's theorum, 
a logical straight-forward derivative of differences in sub-group 
cultures. Rhetoric is largely symbolic, the act of voting, 
predominantly an expression of a locally-oriented, group-fostered 
mentalite rather than an instrumental or rational choice among 
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candidates who take different positions on issues (p. 157). This 
behaviorist view of politics, which has come under increasing attack 
by the "rational choice" school of political scientists, who have 
access to surveys of the twentieth century electorate, may more 
closely fit the nineteenth century, but it certainly deserves closer 
scrutiny than Hays or any of the other ethnoculturalists have given 
it. A glance at "rational actor" models in political science 
suggests, too, that Hays places too little stress on the role of 
elected officeholders and officeseekers in shaping the voters' choice 
sets and tastes, and in organizing them into blocs. While his studies 
do, commendably, span both the electoral and the policy areas, he 
neglects courts and legislatures, and consequently gives too little 
notice in his general remarks on politics to the differences which 
variations in institutional structures have made. Pictures of 
politics which blot out its societal background are surely defective, 
as the thrust of Hays's work clearly demonstrates. But portraits 
which leave out major elements of the foreground are also disfigured. 
Hays's attack on what he terms "hard quantifiers" reflects a 
position sufficiently common today as to deserve special attention. 
HQs, he thinks, have chosen problems not on the basis of inherent 
interest, but on the ground of data availability; have sought to apply 
the "precise theories" of static social science to the messy dynamics 
of long-run change; and have underemphasized research design and the 
inductive logic necessary to link data to concepts and overemphasized 
formal statistical training. No such formal training is necessary, he 
claims; a few "ad hoc 'minicourses'" have done the job for graduate 
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students at Pitt. A "scientific" approach to history is insufficient; 
it must be joined to Diltheyan "imaginative reconstruction" to form 
the true historical art of "informed speculation" (pp. 36-43, 376-79). 
While some of these criticisms are partially correct, none is 
so well taken as to preclude a response. To be sure, HQs are as 
attracted by a sweet data set as more traditional historians are by an 
especially informative manuscript collection. But lacking readily 
available figures on subjects of interest, HQs have also often 
developed them in ways and from sources that no one had thought of 
using systematically before. The reconstitution of European families 
from parish registers springs to mind, but no less innovative have 
been Richard Easterlin's estimates of regional income or Robert Fogel 
and Stanley Engerman's use of New Orleans slave market records and 
plantation birth registers as evidence about young slave women's sex 
lives. In such cases at least, a concern with quantification, far 
from restricting inquiry, has spurred innovation. 
It is true that most social scientific theories lend 
themselves to comparative statics, but are not inherently dynamic, 
that neoclassical economic models, for instance, are not designed to 
accomodate major shifts in tastes or institutions. But the problems 
with which historians are concerned are most often of exactly the 
comparative static variety, and, if other things can be assumed to be 
constant, available structures of understanding can readily 
accommodate discrete changes in tastes or institutions. Consider some 
examples from Hays's own work. Based on stable local group loyalties 
reinforced by the repetition of similar issues in campaign after 
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campaign, voter behavior during most of the 19th century, he asserts, 
was nearly unchanging. The rearrangement of the l890s involved no 
alterations in group mentalities, but merely changes in the actions of 
elites. Nothing in this scene requires moving pictures; a sequence of 
snapshots with the same focus would capture it well enough. Or 
consider what economists would call the "stylized facts" he offers 
regarding the adoptions of at-large voting schemes and city commission 
and manager governments. In this instance, Hays postulates a shift in 
institutions, but none in idologies, and his model is of the 
comparative statics variety. The goals of ward politicians and lower 
class ethnic groups on the one hand and upper class cosmopolitans on 
the other remained constant, he believes, and to test whether the 
institutional shift differentially disadvantaged the former party, he 
tries to measure the power of each at two points in time -- before and 
after the adoption of the new electoral arrangement. Finally, let us 
look at the early 20th century conservation movement. Conflicts 
occurred because a new elite of engineers and scientific managers 
arose to challenge the previously unassailed power of local exploiters 
of the environment, and the new elite propagandized effectively enough 
to create a new body of conservationist opinion in the populus. The 
outcome of each struggle was determined primarily by the institutional 
level at which it was fought. Now, while static models cannot easily 
account for the rise of a new elite or the growth of conservationist 
opinion, neither can any hypotheses Hays proposes. Given these 
changes, pictures of decision-making which postulate maximizing 
behavior on the part of the actors can model the clashes and predict 
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the outcomes of the conservation battles. In general, so long as some 
elements of the sets of actors, tastes, and institutions can be 
assumed to be roughly fixed, which is nearly always true in historical 
investigations, static models can shed a great deal of light on the 
matters to be explained. The search for "dynamic" models, usually a 
fruitless quest, is also usually an unnecessary one for historians. l 
That some HQ's have computed first and analyzed only later and 
then rather mindlessly, just as non-quantifiers have sometimes read 
first, explained only afterwards, and generalized faultily is 
unfortunately correct. But although there is no substitute for a well 
thought out plan of stpdy and often no way to salvage a poorly laid 
out project, a ritualized call for more concentration on research 
design may well only distract historians from deeper difficulties. 
The questions are how to go about setting up a problem properly, 
whether attention to technique and to design can be complementary, or, 
as Hays seems to assume, they are necessarily competitive, and whether 
a hypothesis can be solidly established through the use of overly 
simple or imperfectly understood statistical methods. On the first, 
surely the most desirable way of proceeding is to begin by borrowing 
or constructing the clearest and most completely specified explanation 
sketch possible which is relevant to the particular topic of concern, 
modifying the theory if necessary in light of the results of the 
investigation. To use the language of Bayesian statistics, historians 
should concentrate more than they often do on reducing the diffuseness 
of their prior beliefs. It is deductive logic which is most crucial 
here, not inductive logic, as Hays believes. In regard to the second 
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question, just having to think about statistical techniques which are 
based inherently on causal reasoning, such as regression or logit 
analysis, can often help researchers clarify their hypotheses. To 
yield unbiased results, for instance, OLS regression equations must be 
properly specified; to be interpretable, the independent variables and 
their inherent relationship to each other must be clearly understood. 
What better way would there be to learn research design than to be 
required to puzzle out the logic of variations in the form of a 
complex predictive equation, tracing the arguments for each form back 
to their theoretical roots! To pose a choice between an emphasis on 
training in statistics and training in research design, as Hays does, 
is at best misleading and at worst, seriously muddled. The third 
question answers itself much more resoundingly than Hays seems to 
believe. Simple eyeball comparisons of a time series of votes in a 
few townships or wards just will not establish some propositions which 
Hays asserts are true, such as that nineteenth century electors 
responded primarily to local, rather than to national issues, and that 
their choices were very stable over time (pp. 157,298-99,308,364). 
Nor will data from non-randomly chosen homogeneous areas prove the 
ethnoc~ltural thesis, as I have argued elsewhere. 2 Historical 
craftsmen who work with quantitative data need to acquire a well-
stocked tool kit of techniques, and the period of apprenticeship must 
certainly last longer than a mini-course. 
Finally, it is hard to know what to make of Hays's insistence 
on retaining "imaginative reconstruction" as a proper mode of 
historical thought. If he means only that it and "informed 
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speculation" are inevitable concomitants of the process of historical 
research, then few would quarrel with him. Every student of the past 
muses about what "his" characters must have done or thought in 
situations for which there is no direct evidence. If Hays is saying 
that his own informed speculations in this and his other volumes are 
stimulating and often suggest fruitful paths for research to follow, 
then I would certainly not disagree. But if he is suggesting that 
imagination and speculation alone are sufficient, without firmer 
evidence, to warrant conclusions in history or other empirical fields, 
then I must regretfully leave Hays's often delightful company and rank 
myself with the HQs. 
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Footnotes 
1 • Cf. William W. Beach, "A Second Look: 'The Agenda for 
"Social Science History,"'" Social Science History, 4 (980),357-64. 
Economic Theorists have been working hard over the last decade to 
develop dynamic models, and they have had some notable successes, 
which historians should be more aware of. For starters, see, e.g., 
Burton H. Klein, Dynamic Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1977); David Cass and Karl Shell, The Hamiltonian Approach to 
Dynamic Economics (NY: Academic Press, 1976); Akira Takayama, 
Mathematical Economics (Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1974), 
chapters 5-7. In fact, dynamic arguments have a long tradition in 
economics. See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic 
Analysis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), ch. 9-11, and 
references cited therein. 
2. "The 'New Political History:' A Methodological Critique," 
Reviews in American History, 4 (1976), 1-14. 
